Evaluation and Analysis of Administrative Monopoly in China's Oil Industry by Yan, Gao & Pu, Qian
_________________________________________________________________________49
_______________________________ Administrative Monopoly in China's Oil Industry
Evaluation and Analysis of Administra-
tive Monopoly in China's Oil Industry
GAO YAN AND QIAN PU
Abstract
China's oil and petrochemical industry is under administrative monopoly. 
Administrative monopoly, according to the Unirule Institute of Economics, 
refers to trade monopoly from concessions granted and the monopolistic power 
conferred by administrative departments through administrative documents on 
business entities—enterprises or administrative institutions that are also engaged 
in proﬁt-making activities. Administrative monopolies come in various forms, 
including barriers to entry, special privileges and price regulation, which lead 
to multi-level monopolistic powers and status. The administrative monopoly in 
China's oil and petrochemical industry has evolved from the previous planned 
economy. Although the central government has the motivation to reform state-
owned enterprises to increase revenue, which has been mainly from taxation, 
it lacks the impetus to break the administrative monopoly. This article shows 
that the barriers to entry form high monopoly prices and transfer the consumer 
surplus into business proﬁt, which is unfair and distorts income allocation. After 
analysing the forms and origins of administrative monopoly in China's oil and 
petrochemical industry, the article demonstrates that administrative monopoly 
causes distorted factor prices, compromises fair trade, reduces efﬁciency and 
causes loss of social welfare and degradation of business ethics. This article 
also proposes judicial, administrative and market-oriented reform solutions.
Keywords: oil industry, administrative monopoly, institutional innovation
Introduction
Administrative monopoly occurs mainly in the establishment of bar-
riers to entry and price regulation. The latter can be divided into two 
forms, regulation of seller's or selling priceand regulation of the buyer's 
or buying price, which is reﬂected by the preference and even payment 
exemption to those with administrative monopoly for resources and 
other inputs. As long as there are institutional barriers to entry, even 
with other conditions the same as those in free competition, admin-
istrative monopoly will lead to high prices, low output and welfare 
loss under certain conditions of demand. The employment of barriers 
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to entry established by administrative departments to form high mo-
nopoly prices and transfer the consumer surplus into business proﬁts 
represents an unfair and distorted income allocation mechanism. If the 
resources equivalent to the monopoly proﬁts were diverted to other 
purposes decided by the market, more products would be produced. The 
value of these products would be the opportunity loss of the monopoly 
proﬁt (distorted income allocation) resulting from the administrative 
monopoly, i.e. loss of social welfare.
In fact, in the administrative monopoly, the oligarchies in China's oil 
industry are surrogates of an interest group—the Communist Party of 
China (CPC)—in different stages and phases. In the power game, once 
the political inﬂuence of one political league subsides, the new political 
power holders take ofﬁce and stage political liquidation of the traditional 
interest groups, tightening anti-corruption efforts to gain the support of 
the public and to establish their legitimacy. The current anti-corruption 
movements in China seem to cater to the public's call for the investigation 
and prosecution of the heads of the oil industry monopolies, thereby 
gaining public support for the new political leaders. This act establishes 
a positive image for the new administration. Therefore, it is fair to say 
that the current oil reform is more of a political act than an economic 
one. Superﬁcially, the central government is seeking reforms for cen-
tral government-led state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but in essence, 
the central government is seeking to enhance the market status of the 
central-government-led SOEs by upholding administrative monopolies 
and consolidating the rule of the CPC. It has always been a key goal 
to consolidate the central-government-led SOEs as a foundation of the 
CPC's eternal rule over China, the bottom line of China's reforms. This 
has been understood by all the interest groups and can be found in vari-
ous speeches given by the new political leaders. However, it begs the 
question whether theories and practices support such a proposition. Our 
research and analysis is based on the proposition that reforms should 
be undertaken using market rules and mechanisms. Understanding this 
is very important for evaluating China's oil industry.
This article analyses and explains the forms, origins and consequences 
of administrative monopoly in China's oil and petrochemical industry. 
We demonstrate that administrative monopoly causes distorted resource 
prices and compromises fair tradeand we propose a solution to break ad-
ministrative monopoly by judicial, administrative and market means. 
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Formation and Evolution of Administrative Monopoly in 
the Oil Industry
Before 1979, China's oil industry was totally within the planned econ-
omy. Crude and processed oil were incorporated into a national plan 
for centralized distribution and hierarchical management. A uniﬁed 
purchase and sales channel was established in the countryand oil en-
terprises only needed to fulﬁl the targets set for them.
After 1978, declining output and losses by oil enterprises highlighted 
the low efﬁciency of China's oil industry. As a result, the oil industry 
was reformed several times. A brief history goes as follows (see Figure 
1). In 1979, the State Council approved the output contract policy for 
the former Ministry of Petroleum Industry, stipulating that the oil 
that exceeded the output target could be sold at the international price 
and the balance could be used for oil exploration and exploitation, 
hence the coexistence of planned and market-oriented oil distribu-
tion systems. To facilitate international cooperation on offshore oil 
exploitation, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
was established in March of 1982. CNOOC was to be responsible for 
international cooperation in this regard. In 1983, oil-reﬁning enter-
prises in all sectors were integrated to form the China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec). In September 1988, the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry was dissolved and reorganized into the China Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Corporation (CNPC) to manage onshore oil companies. 
Consequently, in China's oil industry, exploration and exploitation is 
dominated by CNPC, reﬁning is monopolized by Sinopec and offshore 
oil exploration and exploitation is controlled by CNOOC. In 1998, Chi-
na's oil industry was reorganized to divide the oil business into three 
geographic parts, south, north and offshore, respectively controlled 
by Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC, which are all vertically integrated. 
The monopoly in China's oil industry was thus transferred from the 
industry chain to regions.  
After the Ministry of Petroleum Industry was dissolved in 1988, 
CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC gained some industry management power 
in their respective areas. The existing monopoly in China's oil industry 
stems from the reform of the oil distribution system that began in 1994 
and was further consolidated by subsequent clean-up and rectiﬁcation 
policies. In May 1999, the General Ofﬁce of the State Council issued 
an administrative regulation to institute the monopoly of the three 
companies: Opinions on Cleaning-up and Rectifying Small Reﬁneries and 
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Regulating the Distribution Order of Crude Oil and Processed Oil (Guo Ban 
Fa, 1999, No. 38, hereafter referred to as Document No. 38). 
This document intensiﬁes the control of crude oil by CNPC and Si-
nopecand empowers the two companies to monopolize oil reﬁning and 
wholesaling of processed oil. To enter the upstream sectors, private and 
other companies need to cooperate with the CNPC to exploit low-yield 
areas determined by the CNPC and bear all the investment risks. Moreo-
ver, they must turn 20 per cent of the exploited oil over to the CNPC 
at no cost and sell the remaining 80 per cent to the CNPC at a price set 
by the CNPC.1 In the oil reﬁning sector, Sinopec and CNPC are given 
the right to integrate local reﬁneries. The wholesaling of processed oil 
(gasoline, kerosene and diesel oil, the same below) produced by reﬁner-
ies in China is exclusively carried out by the wholesale enterprises of 
CNPC and Sinopec. This document makes it difﬁcult for independent 
wholesalers of processed oil to survive, let alone ﬂourish.
The unveiling of Document No. 38 closely followed the approval of 
the reform of institutions under the State Council by the 1st Session of 
the 9th National People's Congress in March 1998. The plan set up two 
super-large groups: CNPC and Sinopec. The two groups were granted 
monopoly in the industry before they were ofﬁcially established so 
that they could expand rapidly to cope with the ﬁerce competition of 
multinational oil companies after China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). China's oil and petrochemical industry had long 
been protected and supported by government quota and permit sys-
tems, high tariff barriers and market entry regulations to restrict the 
import of crude and processed oiland to exclude foreign companies 
from engaging in the wholesale and retail of crude and processed oil. 
Domestic oil companies that have grown up under the protection of such 
policies can hardly compete with multinational companies. Therefore, 
some think that 'to give the two groups monopoly before liberalizing 
the industry can rapidly increase their competence and set up a wall 
to ward off foreign capital.2 Moreover, in the name of safeguarding the 
order of the market economy, clean-up and rectiﬁcation policies were 
issued to further consolidate this mechanism. 
The formation of the existing monopoly mechanism in the processed oil 
and crude oil markets was facilitated by policies promulgated by ministries 
and commissions of the State Council to advance the market economy, 
cope with international competition after China's accession to the WTO 
and undertake reform. The present monopoly in China's oil industry is 
not a result of market competition, but of top-down changes enacted by 
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administrative departments by administrative means. Therefore, it has 
had a strong administrative character from the very beginning.
Analysis of the Internal Mechanism for Administrative 
Monopoly in the Oil Industry
In addition to the fact that administrative monopoly in China's oil 
industry was born out of the previous planned economy system, the 
major reason why administrative departments create, ensure, expand 
and advance a monopoly in the oil industry by regulatory means is that 
closely bonded interest groups are formed between them and monopoly 
enterprises. According to the theory of economic regulation created by 
Peltzman and other economists, the utility function of a regulator is not 
to maximize social welfare but its own political interest.3 However, in 
China, because the administrative departments are completely different 
from their US counterparts in formation and operating mechanisms, 
they have different objectives. Yu Hui (2000) thinks that in a regulated 
market, legislators and regulators do not need to pursue maximum 
votes. Instead, they follow the same objectives as enterprises, i.e. the 
maximization of utility and taxation. 
Resource industries, especially the oil industry, feature relatively high 
entry costs and low price elasticity of demand, which is conducive to 
helping oil companies get monopoly proﬁts by setting high monopoly 
prices. The central government and administrative departments of dif-
ferent industries have different interest claims. The central government 
can share the revenue through taxation, while government departments 
(and even ofﬁcials) can 'set rent' and 'seek rent' through institutional bar-
riers to entry and preferential policies to share the monopoly interest. 
Low Price Elasticity of Demand Gives Rise to High Monopoly 
Proﬁts
The industry-speciﬁc distribution of administrative monopoly in China 
is actually the result of a common choice by administrative departments 
and speciﬁc enterprises. When setting institutional barriers to entry and 
unveiling preferential policies for certain enterprises, administrative 
departments will consider the costs and beneﬁts to a certain degree. 
When the demand is less elastic, the price rise will increase the beneﬁts 
of monopolists. Multiple studies indicate that the oil industry lacks the 
price elasticity of demand, which makes it possible for oil companies to 
set and maintain high monopoly prices to gain high monopoly returns. 
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In 2010-2011, the net proﬁts of CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC totalled RMB 
2.06 trillion. During the same period, the proﬁts of industrial enterprises 
above a designated size in China amounted to RMB 27.18 trillion.
Maximization of the Central Government's Fiscal Revenue
In this article, central ﬁscal revenue is used to replace the gains of the 
central government from administrative monopoly. When the oil indus-
try suffers losses, potential entrants will be blocked, which will hinder 
the growth of the industry itself. When demand rises rapidly at the 
established price level, the ﬁnancial deﬁcit will be highlighted. In this 
context, it is a practical and natural choice for the government to loosen 
regulation in exchange for ﬁscal revenue. After 1978, the low efﬁciency 
of China's oil industry was highlighted by declining output and losses 
of oil enterprises. Therefore, the government loosened regulation of this 
industry mainly in two aspects. First, it adopted a double-track price 
system. Secondly, it loosened entry control. From the late 1980s to 2000, 
many private companies entered the oil and natural gas business. 
However, since 2000, the price of mineral resources has been rising 
around the world. As the resource rent increases, the game in which 
the government departments at all levels, mineral authorities, central 
enterprises, local SOEs and private investors take part is becoming in-
creasingly ﬁerce. In reality, the central government is not neutral, but 
an organization with multiple objectives. Its objectives include social 
welfare, GDP growth and maximization of ﬁscal revenue. Essentially, it 
is a revenue-oriented government. In terms of its approach to economic 
development, a revenue-oriented government often becomes the prin-
cipal part of economic activities by controlling or monopolizing social 
resources. Central enterprises can be deemed carriers for the economic 
activities of the central government.
In the tax structure of oil enterprises, rents directly attached to oil re-
sources mainly include a resource tax, a mineral resource compensation 
and a special oil gain levy. The resource tax is a local tax, the mineral 
resource compensation is divided by the central government and local 
governments at a ratio of 5:5 or 4:6and the special oil gain levy goes to 
the central government as non-tax revenue. Among other taxes, those 
that directly go to the state treasury include consumption tax, business 
income tax and value-added tax. The rates of these taxes are fairly high. 
Taxes that go to local governments include urban construction and 
maintenance tax, education surcharge and a business tax with relatively 
lower rates. Generally, taxes paid by central enterprises go directly to 
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the state treasuryand very little is left for the local government. Sinopec, 
for example, paid a total of RMB 1.23 trillion taxes in 2001-2011. Of that, 
RMB 1.14 went to the state taxation and non-tax income of the central 
government, accounting for 91.98 per cent of the total.
Since the reform of the ﬁnancial system began, central government 
revenue now comes mostly from taxation. Although the central govern-
ment has the motivation to reform SOEs, it lacks the impetus to break 
the administrative monopoly. Under the current ﬁscal and taxation 
system, supporting the expansion of enterprises has become the second 
best choice of the central government.
Department Rent Interest and In-house Lobbying
Government departments are the suppliers of administrative monopoly. 
They are willing to provide administrative monopoly because the 
government is never completely a representative of public interest. In 
China's regulation practice, the behaviour of administrative departments 
and regulated enterprises presents accordance of interestand this is be-
cause both parties integrate the functions of government and enterprise 
(Yu 2008). Even if the parties are separate in form, SOE managers and 
government ofﬁcials are within the same promotion hierarchy (see Table 
1). Because these SOE managers and government ofﬁcials can exchange 
their roles easily thanks to a 'revolving door' mechanism, they can be 
deemed to be in the same group. Therefore, the interest group of the 
regulated industry still has a strong lobbying force and inﬂuence in 
administrative departments. For instance, after China began to adopt 
the new resource tax scheme in 2011, CNPC and Sinopec successfully 
persuaded the central government to raise the threshold of the special oil 
gain from US$ 40 to US$ 55, basically offsetting the rising costs caused 
by the resource tax.
TABLE 1: Executives from Administrative Departments in Three Oil 
Giants (in %) 
2006 2007 2010
CNPC 58.33 54.55 42.86
Sinopec 63.64 63.64 40.00
CNOOC 40.66 44.16 -
Note: Administrative departments include the Petroleum Administration, Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry, Bureau of Petroleum and Chemical Industries, National Development and Reform Com-
mission, Ministry of Commerce, local development planning committees and trade committees. 
Those who previously worked at posts above provincial/ministerial level at local governments 
are also deemed to have worked at administrative departments. 
Source: Data compiled from annual reports of CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC.
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Cross appointments make SOE managers and government ofﬁcials 
quite close to each other; the resulting acquaintance between them makes 
it easier for them to conspire. In addition, as government ofﬁcials are likely 
to work in SOEs in the future, they are quite willing to provide preferential 
policies for SOEs. This can compromise the justice of policies. In fact, as 
the administrative promotion hierarchy gets increasingly narrow, SOEs 
are good places for ofﬁcials who cannot go further up the hierarchy. The 
high salaries and bonuses provided by SOEs can compensate for lack of 
upward mobility. According to ﬁgures in CNPC's annual reports, the per 
capita remuneration of the company's executives in 2007-2010 reached 
RMB 962,900; 892,300; 861,800 and 1.10 million. The more emphasis the 
administrative departments and people inside them put on their rent 
interest, the tighter the administrative monopoly will become. 
Due to the political structure in China, enterprises seek the support 
of public power in a different way. In reference to the expression 'lob-
bying' in the USA, similar activity in China is called 'in-house lobby-
ing'. That is to say, SOE management only needs to lobby the related 
administrative departments instead of the legislature. Because admin-
istrative departments are less transparent than the legislatureand there 
are special relations between SOE managers and government ofﬁcials, 
it is called 'in-house lobbying'. Chinese enterprises can not only push 
administrative departments to enact regulations and policies (depart-
ment legislation) conducive to their monopoly, they can also affect the 
laws promulgated by the legislature to form a pattern of administrative 
monopoly.
Pathways for the Emergence of Administrative 
Monopoly in the Oil Industry
Establish Monopoly through 'Department Legislation'
According to China's legislative practice, the National People's Congress 
and local people's congresses rely on administrative departments to 
draft bills. The ofﬁcial laws need to be speciﬁed by many administra-
tive regulations (Unirule Institute of Economics 2012). In the absence 
of laws, industrial administration often relies on departmental bylaws. 
The absence of administrative departments opens a convenient door for 
enterprises to participate directly in drafting regulations.
In September 1988, the administrative department, the Ministry of 
Petroleum Industry, was dissolved and CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC 
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gained industry administration power in their respective areas. Under 
the current system, the government administration of the oil indus-
try is distributed among different administrative departments. The 
exploration and exploitation of oil is under the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, the price is ﬁxed by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, importing and exporting is decided by the Ministry of 
Commerceand the State Assets Administration Committee supervises 
the maintenance and development of state-owned assets. CNPC and 
Sinopec assume responsibility for oil production, operation and indus-
trial adjustment, operating as an administrative department to some 
extent. Therefore, the three companies are always involved in drafting 
and making industrial regulations and policies. In this process, enter-
prises can secretly embody their interests and get monopoly through 
regulations, rules and policies. They can further extend their monopoly 
by implementing such regulations, rules and policies. By pushing the 
decision making of relevant ministries and commissionsand leverag-
ing a series of regulations and policies, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC 
have a monopoly over the whole industry chain, from the upstream 
sector to retail. 
Set up Institutional Barriers to Entry
The institutional barriers to entry of China's oil industry can be divided 
into explicit and implicit aspects. High entry thresholds are set for oil 
exploitation, reﬁning, wholesaling and retailing of processed oil, import-
ing and exporting crude oil and processed oiland oil reserves. Although 
the Measures for the Control of the Processed Oil Market, enacted in 2007, 
lifted the ban on wholesaling by private companies, the regulation raised 
the 'threshold' for wholesalers and retailers of processed oil The criteria 
for processed oil wholesalers include: over 1 million tons of crude oil 
processing capacity, no less than 0.5 million tons of annual gasoline and 
diesel oil production capacity, no less than RMB 30 million of registered 
capital, no less than 10,000 m3 of oil depot storage capacity, pipes, private 
railroads, road transport or more than 10,000 tons of shipping capacity 
for unloading and transferring processed oil. The entry thresholds for 
wholesale, storage, retail, import and export of crude oil and processed 
oil follow the policies of the former State Economic and Trade Commis-
sion. All these requirements are customized by SOEs that have already 
obtained monopolyand are almost unattainable for potential entrants. 
In addition to explicit barriers, implicit institutional barriers also play 
an important role. For instance, to get import quotas, private companies 
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need to meet the application criteria of the Ministry of Commerce. On 
top of that, they must obtain the certiﬁcates of production scheduling 
issued by CNPC and Sinopec. However, in reality, they can hardly get 
such certiﬁcates from the two giants.
Enhance the Monopoly of the Three Oil Giants through Price 
Regulation
In addition to conferring monopoly power to businesses by means 
of regulations and policies, administrative departments also further 
enhance the monopoly of the three oil giants through price regulation. 
Price regulation can be divided into two forms, regulation of seller's or 
selling priceand regulation of buyer's or buying price, which is reﬂected 
by the preference and even payment exemption to those in possession 
of administrative monopoly for resources and other inputs (Unirule 
Institute of Economics 2012). 
Regulation of seller's price
Under China's administrative monopoly, price regulation is never used 
to mitigate the price distortion caused by market monopoly. On the 
contrary, because of price regulation, the product price and proﬁtability 
of monopolists are increased, further distorting the prices and leading 
to exacerbated loss of social welfare. Although the pricing mechanism 
for processed oil in China seems to align with international practiceand 
the right to ﬁx and adjust the price is reserved by the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission, the price is still very high. In 2012, 
TABLE 2: Comparison of Average Pre-tax Gasoline Prices  
(US$/gallon)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgium 2.26 2.50 3.20 2.21 2.72 3.49
France 2.12 2.36 3.02 2.15 2.59 3.38
Germany 2.15 2.38 2.91 2.15 2.58 3.31
Italy 2.42 2.64 3.34 2.46 2.88 3.66
Netherlands 2.49 2.87 3.51 2.31 2.68 3.44
UK 2.14 2.35 2.95 1.93 2.46 3.21
USA 2.40 2.62 3.15 2.19 2.63 3.36
International weighted average 2.30 2.57 3.06 2.18 2.64 3.38
China 2.07 2.26 2.80 2.72 3.22 3.92 
Source: US Energy Information Administration; price adjustment information on the web-
sites of the National Development and Reform Commission and Beijing Municipal Develop-
ment and Reform Commission. See the calculation at: http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.
php?c=article&id=112.
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China's average export price of processed oil was RMB 4.42/L. The 
tax-inclusive oil price calculated according to Sinopec's tax structure 
was about RMB 5.63/L. However, in 2012, the price of No. 92 gasoline 
was RMB 7.31-8.33/L in Beijing.
Since China's oil price began to align with international market prices 
in 2009, the pre-tax price of processed oil in China has been well above 
the international level (see Table 2). In 2009-2011, given the same quality 
standards, the pre-tax prices of gasoline and diesel oil in China were 
respectively 20 per cent and 29 per cent higher than the international 
prices (see Table 3). Therefore, it is obvious that China's current oil pric-
ing mechanism expands the monopoly interest of oil companies.4
TABLE 3: Comparison of Average Pre-tax Diesel Oil Prices  
(US$/gallon)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Belgium 2.39 2.64 3.82 2.30 2.84 3.75
France 2.26 2.48 3.61 2.17 2.64 3.57
Germany 2.27 2.56 3.63 2.26 2.70 3.64
Italy 2.60 2.79 3.96 2.53 2.95 3.92
Netherlands 2.47 2.77 3.94 2.27 2.67 3.70
UK 2.31 2.50 3.58 2.15 2.58 3.48
USA 2.22 2.43 3.39 2.00 2.54 3.36
International weighted average 2.33 2.54 3.50 2.13 2.64 3.52
China 2.15 2.44 3.03 2.95 3.51 4.25 
Source: US Energy Information Administration; price adjustment information on the web-
sites of the National Development and Reform Commission and Beijing Municipal Develop-
ment and Reform Commission. See the calculation at: http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.
php?c=article&id=112.
Regulation of buyer's price
The buyer's price refers to the price paid to owners of resource factors 
by monopoly enterprises as users. In China, the price of resource factors 
is not formed through the mechanism of market competition. Instead, it 
is a regulatory price ﬁxed by the government. In contrast with the high 
seller's price, the factor price ﬁxed by the government is lower than the 
market price.
Factors used by oil companies include land, oil resources, funds, etc. 
Before 2003, SOEs mainly acquired long-term land use rights through 
allocation at no cost or through transfer agreements at low prices. The 
land price was not actually reﬂected through the market mechanism. 
The land acquired by oil companies for no cost or at low prices includes 
land for industrial and commercial purposes. In terms of resource us-
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age cost, prior to 2011, the resource tax rate of oil was less than 2 per 
cent of the price, much lower than the international average rate of 
10 to 20 per cent. The rights and interests of oil resource owners were 
not fully reﬂected and compensated. The fundraising costs of SOEs 
are also much lower than those of private companies. China's credit 
market is still dominated by the major state-owned commercial banks. 
There is government background in the economic behaviour of both 
SOEs and state-owned commercial banks. With government support, 
SOEs can get loans more easily and at preferential interest rates. For 
instance, the interest rate of credits granted by these banks to CNPC is 
10 per cent lower than that of general loans to private enterprises. In 
addition, it is much easier for SOEs to get approval from administra-
tive departments to raise funds by issuing bonds and other low-cost 
means. State-owned companies also receive a large amount in ﬁscal 
subsidies from the government.
As a result of low-cost acquisition and utilization of these factors, 
some rents are transformed into proﬁts for monopolists and the opera-
tional effectiveness of these companies is exaggerated. Land resources, 
mineral resources and ﬁnancial resources are actually monopolized by 
the government, which is constantly enhancing its control over these 
resources. It is because of such administrative monopoly that SOEs 
and private companies have severely unequal access to resources. The 
subsidy granted by the government to compensate the oil industry for 
paying for the production factors it uses further consolidates the com-
petitive advantages of state-owned oil companies in the market and 
increases their proﬁts. For the ultimate owners of resource factors, i.e. 
the people, the subsidy means a loss of welfare. 
Welfare Loss and Allocation Distortion Resulting from 
Monopoly in the Oil Industry
Composition of Welfare Loss and Allocation Distortion 
Under general administrative monopoly, the outputs of monopolists are 
lower than under perfect competition and their prices are higher than 
under perfect competition. Therefore, losses incurred to society include 
two parts: the net loss of social welfare caused by output reductionand 
transfer of consumer surplus to producers due to high monopoly prices. 
For society as a whole, the second transfer is a problem of resource 
allocation. However, such transfer causes monopoly rent, the alloca-
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tion of which includes three aspects: ﬁrst, informal expenditures of 
administrative departments of the monopolized industries; second, 
high salaries and beneﬁts of employees in monopolized industries; 
and third, non-productive expenditures of monopolists, such as duty 
consumption and other conspicuous consumption. In addition, rent 
seeking in monopolized industries will unavoidably cause corruption. 
According to Gordon Tullock (1967), the monopoly rent will ultimately 
be completely dissipated in a non-productive manner, thus becoming 
a welfare loss.
Administrative monopolists in China are quite peculiar in that their 
monopoly proﬁts come from both high monopoly prices and lower 
prices for resource factors. For instance, administrative departments 
grant the resource use right to state-owned monopolists and symboli-
cally collect a small resource occupation or use fee. As a result, a lot of 
resource rent is transformed into the proﬁts of monopolists. The huge 
real costs in the book proﬁts of these companies constitute the net trans-
fer of social welfare to monopolists. However, such a transfer is not 
effectively transformed into more and better products. Therefore, from 
the perspective of society as a whole, this part is a loss, which should 
Source: Unirule Institute of Economics (2013a).
FIGURE 2: Welfare Loss and Allocation Distortion Caused by  
Administrative Monopoly
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be included in the efﬁciency loss of administrative monopoly (Unirule 
Institute of Economics 2013b).
Therefore, in China's oil industry, the welfare loss caused by admin-
istrative monopoly consists of three parts: as can be seen in Figure 2, 
the net welfare loss caused by price increase and production reduction 
resulting from administrative monopoly (triangle OS1S0), allocation 
distortion and welfare loss caused by price monopoly by buyers (quad-
rangle P0P1S1O)and the allocation distortion and welfare loss caused 
by price monopoly by sellers (rectangle CP0O1O2).
Net Welfare Loss
Cowling and Mueller (1978) assumed that a monopolist who seeks to 
maximize proﬁt would choose to make the proﬁt–sales ratio equal to 
the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand: (pm−c)/pm=1/ε. In 
combination with Harberger's computing formula, Cowling and Mueller 
proposed the following formula to calculate the welfare loss of monopoly: 
DWL=π/2, where π is the proﬁt of the company, i.e. the welfare loss result-
ing from monopoly is half of the company's proﬁt. The theory behind the 
study of Cowling and Mueller is optimal proﬁt maximization behaviour. 
But obviously, the proﬁt cannot be completely transformed into monopoly 
proﬁt. Therefore, Cowling and Mueller's estimate is also called the upper 
limit estimate. According to the proﬁts of oil and natural gas exploitation, 
oil processing and coking sectors in China Statistical Yearbook, the upper 
limit of net welfare loss resulting from monopoly in China's oil industry 
in 2001-2010 stood at around RMB 1.545 trillion.
TABLE 4: Proﬁts of the Oil Industry (in RMB 100 million)
Year Proﬁts of oil and gas exploitation Proﬁts of oil processing and coking
2001 978.15 -12.05
2002 1,170.45 50.94
2003 1,221.46 123.41
2004 1,744.65 293.31
2005 2,957.79 -119.27
2006 3,652.12 -312.24
2007 3,535.41 216.15
2008 4,601.23 -1,003.14
2009 1,903.45 931.24
2010 3,026.76 1,221.11
2011 4,299.6 423.1
Total 29,091.07 1,812.56
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001-2010).
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Allocation Distortion and Welfare Loss Resulting from Price 
Monopoly by Buyers
The loss is the welfare transferred from resource owners to monopolists. 
The amount of transferred welfare equals at least the welfare that is lost. 
In a competitive market, these resources can be sold at market prices and 
more products will be produced. In the oil industry, the allocation dis-
tortion and welfare loss mainly involves ﬁscal subsidies granted by the 
government to monopolistic oil companies, fund-raising costs that are 
lower than the market level and the loss of land and resource rents.
Lack of land rent
In 2000, PetroChina signed a land use right rent agreement with CNPC. 
According to the agreement, CNPC would rent about 1.145 billion m2 
of land to PetroChina for 50 years at a rent of only RMB 2 billion a year. 
The unit rent is only RMB 1.75/m2 per year, much lower than the rent 
of land for industrial purposes in the market. Moreover, CNPC did not 
turn the rent over to the government.
According to the Ministry of Land and Resources' ﬁxed base index5 
for land for industrial purposes, the annual rent of land for industrial 
purposes is calculated at a rate of 3 per cent of the land price. Accord-
ingly, the underpayment of land rent by PetroChina totalled RMB 188.6 
billion in 2001-2011 (Table 5). This ﬁgure is still underestimated because 
part of the land rented by PetroChina is used for commercial purposes 
rather than industrial purposes. 
TABLE 5: Estimate of Rent Underpayment by PetroChina for Land 
Used for Industrial Purposes (2001-2011)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Price of land for 
industrial pur-
poses (RMB/
m2 ∙·year)
453 466 493 502 511 524 608 604 617 662 697
Rent under- 
payment 
(RMB 100 
million)
136 140 149 152 155 160 189 187 192 207 219
Source: Price of land for industrial purposes is taken from the website of the Ministry of Land 
and Resources, available at: http://www.landvalue.com.cn/Default.aspx.
If the land price ﬁxed by means of bid tendering, auction and quo-
tation is the market price, the adoption of bid tendering, auction and 
quotation to ﬁx the price of land for gas stations started in China in 2003. 
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During 1990-2002, land allocation and assignment by means of agree-
ment co-existed. Because the price of land assigned by agreement was 
much lower than the market price, the land rent was underestimated. 
According to the Ministry of Land and Resources' ﬁxed base index6 of 
the land for commercial and service purposes, the annual rent of land 
for commercial and service purposes is calculated at a rate of 5 per cent 
of the land price. According to the average price of land for commercial 
and service purposes between 2003 and 2010, it is estimated that the 
underpayment of rent for land of gas stations by CNPC and Sinopec 
totalled RMB 207.1 billion (Unirule Institute of Economics 2012).
TABLE 6: Estimate of Rent Underpayment by CNPC and Sinopec for 
Land Used for Gas Stations (2003-2011)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Price of land for 
commercial and 
service purposes 
(RMB/m2 ∙year)
4,263 4,547 4,760 4,973 5,471 5,542 5,862 6,537 7,176
Rent underpay-
ment (RMB 100 
million)
178 190 199 209 231 234 248 277 305
Source: The prices of land for commercial and service purposes are calculated according to data 
on the website of the Ministry of Land and Resources, available at: http://www.landvalue.
com.cn/Default.aspx.
Lack of resource rent
Oil and gas resource taxes, mineral resource compensation, mining 
royalties and special oil gains constitute the system of resource taxes 
in China's oil and natural gas industry. The resource taxes and fees 
represent the rents collected by resource owners, which can be divided 
into absolute rent and differential rent. Resource rent, mineral resource 
compensation and mining royalties fall into absolute rent, which should 
be incorporated into product cost. As a differential rent, special oil gains 
refers to the rent collected for the part in excess when the price of crude 
oil exceeds a certain amount. 
TABLE 7: Underpayment of Oil Rent by CNPC and Sinopec,  
2001-2011 (in RMB 100 million)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Underpay-
ment of oil 
rent
194 190 238 285 473 308 309 290 311 301 181
Source: Calculated according to data in the annual reports of CNPC and Sinopec.
66 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 32(1)•2014
Gao Yan and Qian Pu _______________________________________________________
In general, the resource rate in China is still quite low. According to 
ﬁgures in the annual reports of CNPC and Sinopec, the resource rate 
of the oil industry has long been below 1 per cent, much lower than the 
rate in many other countries. The interests of oil resource owners are 
not fully reﬂected and safeguarded. Although as of November 2011, 
the resource rate of oil and natural gas was raised to 5 per cent, it is 
still lower than the rate in many other countries, where the rate is 10 
to 20 per cent.
In this article, when calculating the payable resource rent, if the oil 
price is lower than US$ 40, the rent should be 10 per cent of the price. 
The part in excess of US$ 40 should be calculated according to the criteria 
of special oil gains in China. With the resource rent that was paid be-
ing deducted, the underpayment of rent by oil companies in 2001-2011 
totalled RMB 308 billion (Unirule Institute of Economics 2012).
Underpayment of interest 
Monopolistic oil companies in China have been gaining a large quantity 
of ﬁnancial resources at a cost much lower than market interest rates, 
leading to the improper allocation of ﬁnancial resources, that is, savings 
that fundamentally belong to people are used to subsidize monopolistic 
oil companies. In 2000-2007, the weighted average interest rate of loans 
for the manufacturing sector (exclusive of SOEs) was 4.68 per cent 
(Unirule Institute of Economics 2013c). According to ﬁgures disclosed 
by CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC, the weighted average interest rate of 
their loans was 1.02 per cent, 1.58 per cent and 1.13 per cent respectively. 
If calculated at the 4.68 per cent market interest rate, the underpayment 
of interest by the three monopolistic oil companies totalled RMB 287.9 
billion in the past ten years. 
TABLE 8: Underpayment of Fund Costs by CNPC, Sinopec and 
CNOOC, 2001-2011 (in RMB 100 million)
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Underpay-
ment of 
fund costs
96 96 130 160 197 200 241 268 383 474 634
Source: Calculated according to data in annual reports of CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC.
Government subsidy 
In 2001-2010, CNPC and Sinopec received a total of RMB 100.8 billion in 
subsidies from the government. In 2009, although the oil price in China 
was much higher than the crude oil price on the international market, 
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CNPC still received a subsidy of RMB 1.097 billion from the govern-
ment as 'the ﬁscal support subsidy that should be paid to CNPC for 
ensuring the supply of crude oil and processed oil in China' according 
to the 2008 annual report of CNPC. In contrast, privately owned local 
reﬁneries failed to receive any reﬁning subsidy or establish downstream 
sales systems in more than ten years.
The loss in oil reﬁning has been an excuse used by oil reﬁneries to ap-
ply for government subsidies. Despite the loss, this sector has not been 
fully opened to other capital, mainly because state-owned oil reﬁneries 
can encroach on the proﬁts of private capital through monopoly and can 
further squeeze the proﬁtability of private reﬁneries and gas stations. 
This has been proven by the large losses of CNPC and Sinopec in oil 
reﬁning and their huge overall proﬁts. 
Methodology
Through monopolistic prices, consumer surplus is transferred to produc-
ers. Although superﬁcially it is a transfer of welfare, monopoly proﬁt 
can eventually be translated into high beneﬁts to monopolist employees, 
duty consumption and other types of corruption of managers. Therefore, 
in terms of opportunity cost, it is a loss of welfare, because the welfare 
transferred to monopolists is not used for productive activities. If used 
for productive activities, the welfare would produce at least the same 
amount of value. 
Due to the difference in the average processed oil price in China and 
the weighted average price on the international market, the transfer and 
loss of welfare totalled RMB 437.8 billion during 2006-2010 . 
TABLE 9: Welfare Loss Resulting from Price Monopoly  
(in RMB 100 million) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gasoline -385 -503 -454 971 1,177 
Diesel oil -537 -311 -1,395 2,635 3,179 
Total -922 -813 -1,850 3,607 4,356 
Note: Sinopec's sales of gasoline and diesel oil are calculated at a ratio of 1:2. 
Source: Sales data of gasoline and diesel oil are taken from the annual reports of CNPC and 
Sinopec (2006-2011). 
Total Welfare Loss
According to the above calculations and analysis, the total welfare loss 
resulting from administrative monopoly in China's oil industry includes 
(1) net welfare loss caused by monopoly; (2) underestimated costs, in-
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cluding government subsidies, fund-raising costs, land rent and resource 
rent; and (3) monopoly proﬁts brought by high monopoly prices. The 
welfare loss totals RMB 2.7 trillion, accounting for 105 per cent of the 
proﬁt of China's oil industry (Table 10).
TABLE 10: Total Welfare Loss of Monopolistic Oil Companies,  
2001-2010 (in RMB 100 million)
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net wel-
fare loss 483 611 672 1,019 1,419 1,670 1,876 1,799 1,417 2,124
Govern-
ment 
subsidy -- -- -- -- 98 58 61 672 11 27 
Fund-rais-
ing cost 96 96 130 160 197 200 241 268 383 474 
Land rent 136 140 327 343 355 369 419 421 440 484 
Resource 
rent
194 190 238 285 473 308 309 290 311 301 
Seller's 
monopoly -- -- -- -- -- -922 -813 -1,850 3,607 4,356 
Total 909 1,037 1,367 1,807 2,542 1,683 2,093 1,600 6,169 7,766
Source: Calculated according to data in annual reports of CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC.
Wealth Redistribution Mechanism
The use of resources at very low prices or for free transforms part of the 
rent of resources into the proﬁt of the oil enterprises. In addition, subsidies 
from the government and the monopoly proﬁts from the administrative 
monopoly status beneﬁt these oil enterprises and make them appear prof-
itable. The turnover of revenues and the income distribution system make 
high-ranking executives and ordinary staff the biggest beneﬁciaries. 
Before the release of Suggestions on Operating Budget for State-Owned 
Capital (State Council [2007] No. 26) by the State Council, it had been 13 
years since SOEs had turned over any of their proﬁts. It was not until 
2008 that the central government implemented the Suggestions and made 
central government-led state-owned enterprises budget their operating 
capital. Nevertheless, the turnover revenue of SOEs even today accounts 
on average for less than 10 per cent of their proﬁts. 
The huge nominal proﬁts have attracted signiﬁcant interest from the 
most important executives in senior management of central government-
led SOEs. Even with the 10 per cent turnover of revenues, this group 
still holds most of the proﬁts of most of the SOEs. The true owners of 
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the resources (Chinese nationals) and their surrogate (the government) 
have not acted on their rights as owners and managed the nominal 
revenues directly. Because the C-suites of the SOEs decide salaries and 
bonuses for themselves and their staff, the revenues of the SOEs ﬂow 
mostly into these two areas after business income taxes. 
In 2011, the State Economic and Trade Commission released Sugges-
tions on Deepening Reform of the State-Owned Enterprise Internal Personnel, 
Labourand the Distribution System. Here, SOE senior management was 
entrusted with 'self-determining' salary standards for their staff. Even 
with the overall salary budget controlled by the State-owned Assets Su-
pervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2010, the room to 
manoeuvre was still large. In 2010, the average salary for CNOOC was 
ten times that of the social average of Chinese people according to data 
from China Statistical Yearbook that year. In 2011, the average income of 
the oil industry was about 4.5 times that of the social average. In addition 
to the nominal income gap on the books, there are invisible bonuses and 
subsidies for staff of central-government-led SOEs, including housing 
subsidies and medical subsidies.
In December 2009, SASAC released Interim Procedures to Assess the 
Performance of Central Government-Led State-Owned Enterprise Executives, 
requiring that executive salaries be pegged to the enterprise's perform-
ance. However, there is a serious overlap in the internal governance 
structure of the SOEs as the members of the board can also shoulder 
managerial duties, which facilitates the so-called 'internal control'. This 
disables the independence of the salary system for executives in SOEs. 
FIGURE 3: Flow of Revenues
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Resource Rent from the 
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In recent years, the annual salary of high-ranking executives of CNPC 
accelerated to RMB 1 million; meanwhile, the nominal net proﬁt margin 
decreased. The connection between the income of executives and the 
performance of the enterprises is missing. Besides, this performance is 
not based on fair competition according to the market rules. 
TABLE 11: Income of Executives of the Oil Industry (in RMB 10,000)
CNPC Sinopec CNOOC
2007 96 80 844
2008 89 82 949
2009 86 72 1,097
2010 110 97 1,014
2011 101 97 603
Note: Based on the average of the three highest incomes for executives. For CNOOC, option 
incomes of the executives are included. 
Source: Annual reports of enterprises. 
In addition to nominal incomes, on-the-job consumption and invis-
ible salaries and bonuses are paid to the executives and staff of the oil 
enterprises, which are not disclosed in the annual reports. According 
to the research of the Report on Executive Compensation Index of China's 
Listed Companies (2011), taking CNPC as an example, the on-the-job con-
sumption and invisible bonuses and subsidies can be calculated roughly 
by assessing the non-operating money ﬂow disclosed by their annual 
reports. We concluded that the invisible compensations are considerably 
higher than the nominal income of the high-ranking executives.
Source: Annual reports of the enterprises and China Statistical Yearbooks.
FIGURE 4: Income of the Staff of the Three Big Oil Enterprises and 
the Social Average (in RMB)
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TABLE 12: On-the-Job Consumption and Invisible Compensation for 
Staff and Executives of CNPC
Year On-the-Job Consumption
(RMB 100 million)
Average Invisible Compensa-
tion (RMB 10,000)
2007 567.97 14.56
2008 535.14 14.46
2009 647.56 14.51
2010 749.5 16.55
Source: Gao (2011).
Most of the monopoly revenues of the oil enterprises become con-
sumption for non-production purposes, which from the perspective of 
opportunity cost, is a welfare loss. In addition, the administrative mo-
nopoly results in huge resource allocation losses and low efﬁciencyand 
is a major cause of the unfair income distribution in China.
Measures to Break Administrative Monopoly in the Oil 
Industry
The administrative monopoly in China's oil industry stems from a 
series of regulations enacted by administrative departments. These 
'department legislations' jeopardize the sound development of the oil 
industry, affect the effective supply of oil products and undermine 
fair competition in the industry. Whether the existing administrative 
monopoly in the oil industry can be broken and administrative mo-
nopoly of interest groups over the industry can be eradicated depends 
mainly on the faith and resolve of politicians. On this basis, we should 
do the following.
Source: Calculated according to the data in the annual reports of CNPC (2006-2011) and China 
Statistical Yearbook.
FIGURE 5: Nominal Net Proﬁt Margin of CNPC
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First, identify the reform objectives and reach consensus on boost-
ing the reform of the crude oil and processed oil markets. Speciﬁcally, 
an oil and natural gas industry system based on the market system 
needs to be established. Because oil and natural gas have the nature 
of private goodsand their production has a competitive nature, the oil 
and natural gas industry should adopt the market system as its fun-
damental system. This means that enterprises can enter the industry 
freely, enterprises in this industry have equal rights, no enterprises 
should have access privileges or preferential prices for resources and 
the government should not intervene in the price, output or number 
of enterprises in this industry.
Under a market system, the basic function of the government is to 
protect property rights, safeguard market order and create and main-
tain an environment for competition. The government should stop 
and punish any violation of market rules. For instance, in the case of 
unfair competition, the government should stop it and punish it in 
accordance with the law.
In addition, a fair and effective pattern for market competition across 
the oil and natural gas industry must be created. In the oil industry 
chain, due to the high risks led by inadequate exploration and the in-
trinsic monopoly nature in oil transportation, the government should 
provide appropriate subsidies and regulations to promote market 
competition. However, the reﬁning, wholesale, retail and trade sectors 
should be open to enterprises for free competition and the government 
should safeguard the fair play mechanism. 
Second, to achieve these reform objectives, the following measures 
should be taken: (1) cancel the administrative monopoly of the oil giants 
and take back the administrative power conferred on them; (2) establish 
an independent and neutral regulatory institution for supervision of 
safety, technology, environmental protection and quality in the energy 
industry; (3) liberalize all sectors of the oil and petrochemical industry 
for the free entry of enterprises; and (4), eradicate price regulation. 
The reform actually consists of two important aspects: deregulate 
the market and liberalize the price. Deregulating the market would 
mean lifting the ban in the crude oil and processed oil markets so that 
every enterprise can enter the market freely. If the entry of all enter-
prises needs to be regulated, the regulatory institution must specify 
the reason and get approval from the legislature to exercise regulation. 
Entry regulations should apply to all enterprises equally. Liberalizing 
the price would mean eliminating the price regulation of crude oil 
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and processed oil after the crude oil and processed oil markets are 
deregulated to form market prices resulting from competition among 
many enterprises.
Comments on Proposals to Reform the Oil Industry
The report of the Unirule Institute of Economics7 on deregulating the 
crude oil and processed oil markets points out that market deregula-
tion is a reform in tradeand it presents the following characteristics 
and beneﬁts.
First, compared with other reforms in the oil and natural gas indus-
try, the deregulation of oil and the processed oil market is quite ﬂexible 
and less costly.
Reforms in other areas of the oil and natural gas industry, such as ex-
ploration, mining and reﬁning, involve relevant laws such as the Minerals 
Law, or involve the core part of the existing administrative monopoly. 
The deregulation of the crude oil and processed oil markets only involves 
market entry. Although there are some administrative documents (such 
as Document No. 38) that hamper the entry of enterprises, they are at 
lower legal levels and it is easier to make breakthroughs. 
Second, the deregulation of crude and processed oil markets will fa-
cilitate reform in mining, reﬁning and other production areas. When the 
crude oil and processed oil markets are deregulated, market prices will 
be formed through competition. This price will squeeze the bubble in the 
regulated monopoly price, reduce the nominal proﬁt of monopolists and 
facilitate reform to break up monopolies. On the other hand, because of 
increased crude oil supply, private and other reﬁneries will grow. 
Third, when the crude oil and processed oil markets are initially de-
regulated, the interest of existing monopolists is not directly harmed. 
Because there is not much difference in prices of crude oil and processed 
oil in China and the international market, the entry of new enterprises 
will not cause dramatic changes in the price within a short time. There-
fore, the interest of existing enterprises in the market will not be reduced 
much. As a result, they will pose less resistance to deregulationand the 
reform will proceed without much difﬁculty.
Fourth, the deregulation of the crude oil and processed oil markets 
will prime the pump for reform in other areas of the oil and natural 
gas industry. The deregulation of the crude oil and processed oil mar-
kets will eventually result in the uniﬁcation of domestic crude oil and 
processed markets. Therefore, to change the price in China's crude oil 
and processed oil markets and send the right price signal will boost 
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the growth of non-monopolistic oil companies, change the supply and 
demand of crude oil and processed oil in Chinaand even reshape the 
world's energy pattern.
Fifth, the deregulation of the crude oil and processed oil markets will 
enhance the cooperation and economic and trade integration between 
China and its economic partners. 
Conclusion
We can see that SOEs (especially CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) can attain 
industry monopoly with concessions granted by the government. The 
institutional framework enables them to get resource factors at low costs 
and control the upstream industry chain. They can further extend their 
monopoly to the whole industry, protect their vested interestsand refuse 
to deal with real stakeholders, i.e. they will ensure maximum department 
interest through discriminatory selection in market deals. Undoubtedly, 
this behaviour will have severe consequences. It has been proved that 
selective deals under industry monopoly will compromise social justice, 
affect efﬁciency, restrict the growth of the private sector and market 
economy, reduce total social welfare and increase the transaction cost 
for the whole society. Moreover, because the fundamental principle of 
the market economy is damaged, private companies have to collude 
with or even bribe resource controllers to get resources, which will lead 
to the degradation of business ethics. Therefore, China's reform must 
be further deepened. This will inevitably touch the vested interests of 
monopoly groups in the industryand that is where the reform difﬁculty 
lies. To break the administrative monopoly requires judicial, administra-
tive and market means. It takes courageand more importantly, wisdom 
and viable approaches to advance this reform.
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NOTES
1  All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, 2006, 'Proposals about seriously 
implementing the Document No. 38 of the State Council to create a fair playing ﬁeld 
for private petroleum enterprises'.
2  Yang Zhongxu 2012, 'Glass Door in the Oil Industry: Private Oil Companies Con-
strained in the Upstream and Downstream Business'. Caijing Magazine.
3  In Sam Peltzman's 'The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregula-
tion', he pointed out that 'self-interested politicians and constituents exchange objects 
of utility—a price or entry certiﬁcate for votes and money—and what matters to 
each actor is their wealth or utility, not the aggregate social wealth'.
4  Chen Yongjie, 2012, 'The RMB 100 billion reﬁning loss claimed by CNPC and Sinopec 
is much exaggerated', overseas edition of People's Daily, 2 April, p. 2.
5  The ﬁxed base index of land for industrial purposes uses the average price of land 
for industrial purposes in major Chinese cities in 2000 as the baseand the index 
number is a ratio of the annual average price of land for industrial purposes and 
the average price in 2000.
6  The ﬁxed base index of land for commercial purposes uses the average price of land 
for commercial purposes in major Chinese cities in 2000 as the baseand the index 
number is a ratio of the annual average price of land for commercial purposes and 
the average price in 2000.
7  Unirule Institute of Economics (2013a). The original report was published in Chinese. 
An English version will be published by World Scientiﬁc Press in 2014.
REFERENCES
Cowling, Keithand Dennis C. Mueller 1978. 'The Social Cost of Monopoly Power'. The 
Economic Journal 88 (1): 724-748.
Gao Minghua 2011. Report on Executive Compensation Index of China's Listed Companies. 
Beijing: Economic Science Press.
Peltzman, Sam 1989. 'The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregula-
tion'. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics.
Tullock, G. 1967. 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly and Theft'. Western Economic 
Journal 5 (3): 224-232.
Unirule Institute of Economics 2012. Cause, Behaviour and Eradication of Admin-
istrative Monopoly in China. Available at: http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.
php?c=article&id=211.
Unirule Institute of Economics 2013a. 'Theoretical Research on and a Reforming Solu-
tion to Opening the Markets of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products'. 
Unirule Institute of Economics 2013b. Deregulation Plan for China's Crude Oil and Proc-
essed Oil Market. Available at:
http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.php?c=article&id=112.
Unirule Institute of Economics 2013c. The Nature, Performance and Reform of the State-
Owned Enterprises. Singapore: World Scientiﬁc Press.
Yu Huayang 2008. 'Theoretical Hypothesis that Administrative Monopoly Stems from 
Operating Mechanism - Based on the Perspectives of Institutional Demand and 
Supply'. Research on Financial and Economic Issues (1): 29-35.
Yu Hui 2000. 'Alliance between the Government and Enterprises in a Regulated Market 
with China's Telecom Industry as Example'. China Industrial Economics 1: 63-67.
